Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE) Threat Analysis: Pakistan’s Threat Analysis

I – INTRODUCTION:

Pakistan, also known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan اسلامی جمہوریۂ پاکستانis a sovereign South Asian country that had gotten its independence from the British on August 14, 1947.  Pakistan’s capital is Islamabad and it is located 330 40’ N, 730 10’ E.  Pakistan is the second most populous Muslim majority country and has the second largest Shiite population in the world (Ayres 1998, 63).  It is surrounded by China from the North, Afghanistan from the West, Iran from the South, and India from the East.  Pakistan’s official languages are Urdu and English.                        

          Pakistan is considered one of the quickly developing countries in that region besides India and Iran.  Because of Pakistan’s strategic location in the middle of all the nuclear nemeses, it has developed one of the world’s best intelligence services to defend its sovereignty, protect its national security and its territory.  The U.S. government depends heavily on the cooperation and information sharing with the Pakistani’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as the U.S. considers Pakistan to be a valuable ally to have in that region. This cooperation goes back all the way to the Cold War, when the ISI and the CIA sent a U2 spy plane into the Soviet Union (Raman).  In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) increased its dependency on the ISI’s cooperation and joint tasking. As result, ISI and CIA stepped up cooperation to kill or capture senior Al Qaeda leaders like Sheikh Younis Al Mauritan and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (Khokhar 2011).  However, as the U.S. IC escalated its efforts on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. began to crumble, and especially after the CIA’s agent Raymond Davis and the Koran burning incidents. Pakistan has a self-sufficient, highly capable, and a well-organized and trained intelligence service that carries out Pakistan’s intelligence operations domestically and abroad including the U.S, as it will be discussed later in this Pakistan’s threat analysis paper. So, should the U.S. government and IC be worried about this Foreign Intelligence Entity (FIE)? And if so, how much threat does Pakistan really cause towards the U.S. National Security, given that Pakistan already has conducted intelligence and counterintelligence operations against the U.S.?

II – ISI DESCRIPTION, STRUCTURE, CAPABILITIES, AND OPERATIONS:

1 – Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence:

            A – ISI Emblem:

isiPakistan ISI Emblem signifies Faith, Unity, and Discipline as it is written in Urdu on it.


B – Headquarters:

ISI headquarter is mainly located in Islamabad. The complex like facility has an unnoticeable entrance near a private hospital with no signs and an officer in civilian clothes carrying a weapon. The ISI undercover officer is in charge of coordination the entrance security and directs visitors and employees to check point like entrance with barriers, soldiers, and sniffer dogs (Walsh 2011).                    

isi 1

2 – ISI Structure:

Pakistan ISI is one the world’s most effective and well organized intelligence and security services. ISI was established in 1948; however, it was officially given the responsibility to protect Pakistani interests and national security domestically and internationally in 1950. The ISI comprises of over 25,000 employees mainly from the police, military, and specialized military units and it is under the direction of Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha (“Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),”). ISI conducts numerous tasks such as collection of foreign and domestic intelligence, co-ordination of intelligence tasks of the three Pakistani military services, conducts surveillance over its force, foreigners, media, political leaders, foreign diplomats and dignitaries, Pakistani diplomats overseas, intercepts and monitors communications, and engages in covert offensive and warfare operations (Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),”). All these duties are controlled by the designated 8 divisions within the ISI. These divisions are: Joint Intelligence X (JIX), which serves as the secretariat that co-ordinate with other ISI divisions. It prepares intelligence reports and estimates as well as threat analysis, which then sends to the other divisions. The second division within the ISI is the Joint Intelligence Bureau (JIB). This division is one of the largest and most powerful divisions of the ISI. The JIB observes political intelligence. This division has three subdivisions one is completely devoted to operations against India, one devoted to anti-terrorism operations, and the last one in charge of VIP security (“Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),”). The third division of the ISI is the Joint Counter Intelligence Bureau (JCIB). This division’s duties are to conduct intelligence operations abroad and especially in Russia, Israel, South and Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East (“Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),”). The JCIB also is tasked with conducting surveillance on Pakistani diplomats abroad and in some case foreign diplomats as well. Another division of the ISI is the Joint Intelligence /North (JIN). JIN is entirely responsible for operations in the Jammu and Kashmir areas. The fifth division within the ISI is the Joint Intelligence Miscellaneous (JIM). JIM is responsible for conducting covert offensive intelligence operations and war espionage. The sixth ISI division is the Joint Signal Intelligence Bureau (JSIB). JSIB is the ISI division that handles all signal intelligence (SIGINT). It intercepts, monitors, and collects SIGINT from the neighboring countries as well as it supports the ISI operations. The seventh division is the Joint Intelligence Technical (JIT). JIT division staffs mostly military engineers and scientists that work on developing Pakistan’s science and technology to advance Pakistan intelligence collection and defend it against electronic warfare. The last division of the ISI is the SS Directorate. SS is believed to be the Pakistani version of the CIA’s Special Activities Division. SS is for covert actions and paramilitary special operations. The SS monitors and infiltrates terrorist groups that operate in Pakistan against the government of Pakistan (“Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),”).

3 – ISI Capabilities:

A – ISI Functions:

            Pakistan ISI intelligence functions are the same as any other intelligence service. ISI divided its intelligence functions into four sets which are Collection, Classification, Aggressive Intelligence, and Counterintelligence (CI). ISI implements both overt and covert techniques to collect and extract critical intelligence to Pakistan’s strategic interests and national security. ISI classifies intelligence as suitable after analysts have evaluated it and sorted through it, and then the intelligence is uploaded to the ISI network in the headquarters. ISI also practices aggressive intelligence missions to include espionage, sabotage, subversion, and psychological warfare. Lastly, ISI has a special section devoted to conduct CI operations against FIE’s collection efforts (“Directorate for Inter-Services,”). 

B – ISI Methods:

            ISI applies numerous methods and techniques to conduct its intelligence and CI operations at home and abroad. These methods are meticulously chosen by the ISI because they provide the cover necessary for ISI intelligence operatives to operate under the radar. Some of these tactical methods are working under diplomatic cover. ISI officers find diplomatic cover to be a perfect way to conduct tasks in the foreign target country without being detected. They also like to work in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because it conceals their activities. Furthermore, ISI officers work in international media centers because they provide the desired freedom of movement for the agents (“Directorate for Inter-Services,”). The ISI preserves an inter-agency cooperation with multiple FIEs like the British MI6, CIA, Chinese intelligence services, the Saudi Arabia intelligence services, and many more. This inter-agency cooperation and information sharing relationship allows ISI officers to enjoy some sort of tactical maneuver in the foreign host countries (“Directorate for Inter-Services,”).

4 – ISI Operations:

                        A – Against Foreign Nations:

            The ISI has a long history of undeniably impressive operational success. It has participated in several covert actions and operations in Afghanistan (with CIA &Mossad) as well as other solo operations in Bosnia, India, Israel, Libya, Iran, France, Russia, U.S., and within Pakistani homeland.

B – Against U.S.:

As one of the world’s most effective intelligence agency, ISI not only conducted intelligence operations against other nations but also conduct and still conducting multiple successful missions against the U.S. To analyze the threat that Pakistan causes towards the U.S. and its interests, one should first evaluate and assess previous intelligence and CI operations against us by the Pakistani ISI. Pakistan has been conducting aggressive intelligence operations against the U.S. as far back as the 1980s. During the Afghan-Soviet war, ISI officers successfully seized two American weapons’ dealers after they bugged and tracked (Brigiadier Tirmazi). It is also believed that the ISI is conducting CI operations against the CIA in Pakistan and Afghanistan after suspecting the CIA of collecting intelligence in uncontrolled Pakistani areas and attempting to penetrate Pakistani nuclear assets (De Young 2011). It is also believed that the ISI had some sort of push in the 1999 release of Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh who was convicted of the beheading of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl (Jehl 2002). Recently, the FBI had arrested an ISI operative, Mohammed Tasleem, working as an attaché in the New York consulate after he threatened several Pakistanis residing in the U.S. to stop them from speaking openly about the Pakistani government and military (Mazzetti et al. 2011).

III – PAKISTAN THREAT ANALYSIS AGAINST THE U.S

In order to arrive at the Pakistan Threat Analysis and have a complete understanding of the Pakistani intelligence structure, capabilities and operations to be able to accurately assess, evaluate and analyze the Threat Analysis, we had to conduct the complete comprehensive study above. There is no doubt by now that Pakistan is fully capable, skilled, and experienced to conduct intelligence and CI operations. Furthermore, it has been confirmed that Pakistan had in fact conducted and still conduct operations against the U.S. Given the estimative evidence, there is a high probability of threat from Pakistan against the U.S.

1 – Personnel, Installations, and Facilities:

            It has been established that Pakistan acquires the necessary tools and experience to target the U.S. and its interests. Pakistan could easily operate in the U.S. through some of the methods discussed earlier in this Threat Analysis paper. Operating under diplomatic cover, ISI agents would enjoy the amount of freedom desired to conduct their missions successfully. This will also provide them with access to classified materials pertaining to U.S. national security. ISI agents could then expand their spy network by recruiting other Pakistanis living and working in the U.S. as agents in place. Additionally, Pakistanis speak English so it will not be difficult for them to penetrate other desired political, economic, or military professions, fields, installations, and facilities as moles to supply their collection effects with raw, tactical and even strategic intelligence. This will bring us to the next and even more hazardous Threat Analysis.

2 – Technology, Defense Industry, and Communications

          Even though Pakistani ISI officers could in fact infiltrate U.S. strategic installations and facilities, and build network of spies and informants, there is a low FIE threat against the U.S. when it comes to targeting, penetrating, and collecting intelligence that concerns to U.S. technology, defense industry, and communications.  Even though Pakistan is proficient at conducting intelligence operations in these fields because of the many operational years of collecting against China, Iran, and India, and was one of the countries besides Russia, China, and Iran attempting to hack into the U.S. military computer systems searching for information and wanting to disrupt or destroy the networks (Nakashima 2011) , this threat is believed to be low because the U.S. possesses  much more advanced and sophisticated intelligence collection instruments as well as a well-seasoned CI corps. Every U.S. government department has its own CI branch. These CI capacities’ sole mission is to identify, monitor, and analyze the efforts of FIEs against U.S. persons, activities, and interests as well as to capture these FIEs and terminate their activities. This Threat Analysis brings us to another complicated one.

3 – Sensitive Military and Intelligence Operations (such as Collection, R&D,

Covert Action, and Identifying US Intelligence Personnel.)

          According to the estimative probability and the consistency of evidence, Pakistani threats against U.S. sensitive military and intelligence operations is estimated to low. Even though Pakistani intelligence officers may have a chance at recruiting collectors and informants, infiltrating facilities, and gaining access to strategic U.S. installations through employment and other means, it will be significantly challenging for ISI officers to gain access to sensitive military and intelligence operations such as Collection, R&D, Covert Action, and Identifying U.S. Intelligence Personnel. This will prove to be tough because of the tight security and CI measures the U.S. government have in place. Unless this FIE recruits, exploits, and uses an agent in place, an American-Pakistani with a security clearance that has access to military or intelligence documents and operations, and that is willing to betray his country for whatever reason, it will be near impossible for an ISI agent to pass a U.S. background check, polygraphs, and CI interviews.

VI – CONCLUSION:

After a lengthy evaluation and assessment of the Pakistani intelligence service ISI’s structure, capabilities, operations, and the threat analysis against the U.S. it would be safe to conclude that Pakistan does cause a threat and a reason to worry on part of the U.S. government and the U.S. IC. Pakistan has an exceptional intelligence service with an undeniably impressive record of operational success. The probability of Pakistan engaging in intelligence and CI operations against the U.S. is estimated to be realistically high, given the recent intelligence activities exercised in the U.S. Although it might be relatively difficult for Pakistan to penetrate the U.S. defense industry, sensitive military and intelligence operations, communication systems, and technology and practice direct intelligence collection, operating low key under diplomatic cover, creating a human network of moles and informants, and gaining access to strategic U.S. installations and facilities could be enough for their collection efforts. Because the U.S. is a democratic nation, people enjoy too much freedom. Some of those freedoms are the freedoms of speech and press. People publish anything they can get hold of. The more sensitive and national security critical, the better it is. Pakistan’s intelligence service does not need to look far or spend unnecessary funds on operations, when they can collect from open sources. The U.S. government can only classify and cover so much, which gives FIEs including the ISI the opportunity to collect, analyze, and evaluate U.S. intelligence, therefore concluding U.S. policy and interests. Pakistan is considered a valuable ally to the U.S. It is the sort of asset that you do not want to compromise.  Considering the strategic geo-location of Pakistan, surrounded by nuclear and dictatorship regimes such as China, Iran, and India and the close proximity to Afghanistan, the core of terrorists and terrorism, makes it prized asset  to the U.S. Pakistan’s ISI have the accessibility to Iran, India, and Afghanistan and enjoy operational success in those regions. This grants the U.S. IC total control and operational maneuverability required to conduct its intelligence operations against these hostile adversaries, thus protecting U.S. national security, foreign policy, interests and intentions as well as defending the homeland.

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Brigadier Tirmazi, Syed A. I. “Profiles of Intelligence.” Combined Printers. Library of Congress.

De Young, Karen. “New estimates put Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal at more than 100.” World

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/pakistan/isi.htm

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http://www.defence.pk/forums/pakistan-defence-industry/551-isi-pakistan-inter-services-

intelligence.html

Jehl, Douglas. “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE SUSPECTS; Death of Reporter Puts Focus

On Pakistan Intelligence Unit.” World (2002).

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puts-focus-pakistan-intelligence-unit.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm

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http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=68597&Cat=6

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Fear.” Asia Pacific (2011),

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/24/world/asia/24isi.html?_r=1&hpw=&pagewanted=al

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Official.” World (2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-

security/several-nations-trying-to-penetrate-us-cyber-networks-says-ex-fbi-

official/2012/04/17/gIQAFAGUPT_story.html

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China’s Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) Economic Espionage Operations Against the United States

The 21st century will be marked by information wars and increased economic and financial espionage. All sorts of knowledge will become strategic intelligence in the struggle for power and dominance. The race for information of all kinds will be motivated not only by a desire to lead, but will be required to avoid obsolescence. It is information that will be the moving force in the 21st century.

         – Alvin Toffler1

 

The relationship between the United States and China has not always been a friendly one.  Both countries spied, and continue to spy, on one another through traditional human sources and through cyber space.  In the last decades, The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intelligence and security services have been profoundly devoted to gathering sensitive military, political, and economic information on the U.S. to bolster China’s military capabilities, foreign and domestic policy, and economic prosperity.  During the Cold War, CIA’s collection operations were solely focused on the Soviet’s KGB.  The two intelligence services collected and analyzed information on one another, and deceived and sabotaged each others’ operations.  The intense conflict between these two adversaries kept China in the blind spot, allowing it to evolve into a rival that posed a grave threat to the US.  The PRC was able to take advantage of the U.S’s inattentiveness, enabling China to conduct operations against the U.S. with significant results. The drastic success of China’s espionage pressured the FBI to rethink their counterintelligence priorities at the end of the Cold War (Wise 2011, 6).  The FBI shifted its focus to the PRC and especially to the espionage war with the Chinese foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the intelligence branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Wise 2011, 6).

The PRC’s intelligence services’ primary mission is to target U.S. nuclear weapons labs and US economic infrastructures. The MSS and PLA’s intelligence branches target the U.S. government and its multiple apparatuses “to collect technical and economic information with the dual purpose of making the Chinese military industrial base more sophisticated and the economy more competitive” (CRS Report China 2006, 14). The MSS also targets a “broad range of U.S. military technology, from the Navy’s most sophisticated weapons systems to the Air Force’s stealth bomber” (Wise 2011, 7) in order to strengthen its military arsenal.  In addition, The PRC also has another mission which is to penetrate the U.S. counterintelligence services to uncover US operations against China and disrupt them (Wise 2011, 7).  The PRC was previously successful at penetrating the U.S. intelligence community through the FBI by using “Honey traps” as in the case of Katrina Leung.  According to the Cox Committee Report, the PRC had stolen classified information for an enhanced radiation weapon “aka” neutron bomb and numerous designs and classified information regarding U.S. thermonuclear warheads in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal (The Cox Committee 1999, ii-xxxvii). 

The PRC had updated its intelligence collection capacity and modified it to the changes that affect the international intelligence arena.  China has developed a new collection apparatus which is very difficult to discern, evaluate, and abolish (A Tradecraft Primer, 2009). This collection method is sculpted around the concept of “a thousand grains of sand” (Wise 2011, 9).  Detecting the PRC’s intelligence modus operandi is a fairly difficult task to accomplish especially through the cyber domain, demonstrating the difficulty to determine the threat analysis to thwart this adversary. Although China’s intelligence operations are known to target US cyberspace and military capabilities, China relentlessly targets the US economic structure.  But why is China interested in US economic property? Does stealing US information and technology aides China to become a more prosperous and strong nation? And what is the threat caused by China’s economic espionage?

Sharon Weinberger shed the light on some cases of economic and property espionage. However, she focused her article about the case of Ke-xue Huang and law aimed to guard intellectual property held by US corporations.  Ke-xue Huang was an engineer who worked at a biofuel company synthesizing genes for vitamin B12 (Weinberger 2010). The article talked about how this person was found guilty by the US government under the economic espionage law for communicating technical aspects of his function with a Chinese university. The article also mentioned six other similar economic espionage cases that were acquitted because of the difficulties faced the US government to prove their ties to the Chinese government.  This goes to underline the sophistication of the Chinese modus operandi and how it is very difficult to uncover China’s hand in such cases. Although the Justice Department attempted to fight the case, they failed to prove any ties between the Chinese university and the Chinese government (Weinberger 2010). This is because China’s economic espionage operations are cleverly planned and executed as China stays behind the scenes controlling its universities and companies.

A scholarly article by Peter Schweizer described how the dwindling global industrial business environment “sparked a growth in economic espionage and spying against and among companies.” (Schweizer 1998) The article also described how some nations like France and Japan conduct their economic espionage, preferring “Cold War recruitment and technical operations and generally includes bribery, discreet theft, combing through other people’s garbage, and aggressive wiretapping.” (Schweizer 1998) However, the article mainly discussed how China’s gathers its share of economic espionage and intellectual theft by targeting former employees who worked for US companies. This technique allows China to stay under the radar as they do not aggressively pursuit “technical data, marketing information, and customer lists.” (Schweizer 1998)  Furthermore, the article talked about the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA).  Schweizer stated that the EEA “represents the first coherent, modern body of criminal law designed to deter these crimes in the US.  EEA regulations render the theft of proprietary economic information such as trade secrets a federal crime and broaden criminal sanctions against computer hackers to cases that involve blackmail. Such acts subject the perpetrators to fines as high as $10 million and jail terms as long as 15 years.” (Schweizer 1998) From this definition, we can conclude that the US takes economic espionage very seriously as it hinders US technological and informational dominance and superiority. Additionally, China is considered the main consumer of US technical data and economic information and the law was put in place to prevent foreign adversaries from steal US economic and industrial trade secrets and especially China.

Similarly, William J Edelman debated the courts interpretation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) based on a case of Chinese economic espionage. The article talked about the case of a suspect that “possessed stolen US trade secrets with the intent to benefit the Chinese government.” (Edelman 2011) This continues to show the persistence of the Chinese government in pursuit of US economic trade secrets. In addition, the article briefly touched on how the trial jury disagreed and were confused over “the statutory element of economic espionage that requires the government prove that the defendants intended or knew that the crime would benefit a foreign government.” (Edelman 2011) Lastly, the article debated the defendant’s attorney about the statute of the law and discussed the court’s attempt “to define the limits of the foreign benefit element of economic espionage”, adding the defendant’s attorney perspective to the court as “should not frame the issue in terms of whether the benefit alleged by the government is a “benefit” under the statute” (Edelman 2011).  China understands the US justice system, thus having the upper hand in keeping its intentions masked under the clock of US courts’ debates and law reforms. This also continues to demonstrate China’s involvement with targeting US economic property and industrial information.

In addition, Carl Pacini talked about the importance of protecting US economic and industrial trade secrets from foreign adversaries. The article addressed ways to protect trade secrets by US companies. One of the suggestions was the signing of employment “confidential non-disclosure agreements” (Pacini et al 2008).  The article also talked about China’s economic espionage techniques.  Some of these techniques are very simple, yet the average US businessman may not be vigilant enough to detect them.  The techniques mentioned in this article were “scanning trade show floors, combing through web sites, eavesdropping in airline terminals and on airline flights, reviewing filings with regulatory agencies, taking photographs of factories and businesses, using data-mining software to search databases on the internet, stealing laptop computers, dumpster diving, and application of the MICES principle.” (Pacini et al 2008)  Analyzing this article clearly demonstrates the length China will go to collect valuable information pertaining to US economic trade secrets.

Richard Friedman discussed why US adversaries conduct economic espionage against the US.  He stated that “spies are normally associated with wartime and the theft of military technology.” (Friedman 1998) However, this assessment is widely false. The article went on to talk about China’s espionage activities against US military and defense technology. Nevertheless, espionage operations do not discriminate between wartime or peacetime, military information or economic trades.  Nations collect all sort of information they may deem is valuable to their national security and economic prosperity. As the global stage becomes more and more weakened by the international economic crisis, countries scramble for information to either achieve dominance or ensure survival.  China’s continuous intelligence collection whether military, economic, or political, demonstrates its constant strive for world dominance.

After a lengthy analysis of credible information and according to the CRS Report for Congress about China, the U.S. government conducted a risk evaluation and a threat analysis of China’s espionage operations targeting the US, based on credible US intelligence indicating the severity of China’s constant espionage collection.  A collective ACH was conducted by the White house, the intelligence community, Stanford’s Critique, the Cox Committee, and the PFIAB (Rudman) Report, presenting China’s threat analysis (CRS Report China, 6-14). China’s relentless pursuit of US information and trade secrets makes it one of the primary advertises that poses a momentous threat to the US national security.  The intelligence community collected proof to substantiate their hypothesis about the hasty advancements of the Chinese nuclear programs, military capabilities, and economic prosperity and affluence.  Based on these governmental findings, the Cox Committee recommended the US intelligence community and the private sector to battle “the PRC’s vacuum operations” (CRS Report China, 6-14). 

From the study, some experts disagree about whether the US government is doing enough to combat and protect its interests and national security against China’s espionage threat.  Nonetheless, US government officials argue that even ally countries such as England, Australia, and Canada are not doing enough to assist the US in defending against the Chinese economic and intellectual property theft.  After evaluating the sheer size of the Chinese intelligence expansion, it is evident that smaller neighboring countries in the region are potentially amongst the most vulnerable to this Chinese intelligence grip.

Neglectfully, according to the analysis and findings about the study, most corporations and organizations are not doing enough to secure their technical data to keep up with China’s swiftly progressing and systematic espionage capabilities.  The PRC has proven to take full advantage of these opportunities (Newman 2011).   However, approaches and suggestions to battle this grave threat were projected by analysts questioned by The Diplomat and Carl Pacini in his scholarly article “Fighting Economic Espionage with State Trade Secret Laws”.   Some of these suggestions to defend against China’s economic espionage are “to restrict the number of Chinese nationals allowed into the US and to develop new multilateral institutions to address the problem” (Newman 2011), and ensure that employees sign “confidential non-disclosure agreements” (Pacini et al 2008).  Other recommendations are to devote “more resources to counterintelligence operations, tougher punishments for convicted spies, better encryption systems, and more private sector involvement were also all mentioned.” (Newman 2011)

The relationship between the United States and China has not always been a friendly one.  Both countries spied, and continue to spy, on one another through traditional human sources and through cyber space.  In the last decades, The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) intelligence and security services have been profoundly devoted to gathering sensitive military, political, and economic information on the U.S. to bolster China’s military capabilities, foreign and domestic policy, and economic prosperity.  During the Cold War, CIA’s collection operations were solely focused on the Soviet’s KGB.  The two intelligence services collected and analyzed information on one another, and deceived and sabotaged each other’s operations.  The intense conflict between these two adversaries kept China in the blind spot, allowing it to evolve into a rival that posed a grave threat to the US.  The PRC was able to take advantage of the U.S’s inattentiveness, enabling China to conduct operations against the U.S. with significant results. The drastic success of China’s espionage pressured the FBI to rethink their counterintelligence priorities at the end of the Cold War (Wise 2011, 6).  The FBI shifted its focus to the PRC and especially to the espionage war with the Chinese foreign spy agency, the Ministry of State Security (MSS), and the intelligence branch of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Wise 2011, 6).

The PRC’s intelligence services’ primary mission is to target U.S. nuclear weapons labs and US economic infrastructures. The MSS and PLA’s intelligence branches target the U.S. government and its multiple apparatuses “to collect technical and economic information with the dual purpose of making the Chinese military industrial base more sophisticated and the economy more competitive” (CRS Report China 2006, 14). The MSS also targets a “broad range of U.S. military technology, from the Navy’s most sophisticated weapons systems to the Air Force’s stealth bomber” (Wise 2011, 7) in order to strengthen its military arsenal.  In addition, The PRC also has another mission which is to penetrate the U.S. counterintelligence services to uncover US operations against China and disrupt them (Wise 2011, 7).  The PRC was previously successful at penetrating the U.S. intelligence community through the FBI by using “Honey traps” as in the case of Katrina Leung.  According to the Cox Committee Report, the PRC had stolen classified information for an enhanced radiation weapon “aka” neutron bomb and numerous designs and classified information regarding U.S. thermonuclear warheads in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal (The Cox Committee 1999, ii-xxxvii). 

The PRC had updated its intelligence collection capacity and modified it to the changes that affect the international intelligence arena.  China has developed a new collection apparatus which is very difficult to discern, evaluate, and abolish (A Tradecraft Primer, 2009). This collection method is sculpted around the concept of “a thousand grains of sand” (Wise 2011, 9).  Detecting the PRC’s intelligence modus operandi is a fairly difficult task to accomplish especially through the cyber domain, demonstrating the difficulty to determine the threat analysis to thwart this adversary. Although China’s intelligence operations are known to target US cyberspace and military capabilities, China relentlessly targets the US economic structure.  Throughout this study, it has become evident that China targets the US economic infrastructure in an attempt to profit its own economy.  China has been very effective at this collection activity based on the literature review and the analysis and findings of the paper. Needless to say, China is a serious adversary that collected a tremendous amount of information pertaining to US economic advancements and strategies and does pose a serious threat to US national security and economic stability. 

 

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Wise, David. Tiger Trap: America’s Secret Spy War with China. New York: Houghton Mifflin

            Harcourt, 2011.

Why did the DIA Create the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) Similar to the CIA’s National Clandestine Service (NCS)?

The Defense Intelligence Agency under the orders and management of the Pentagon created the Defense Clandestine Service to assist the Department of Defense with collecting intelligence pertaining to foreign militaries instead of just focusing on battlefield intelligence.  The Pentagon has decided to renew and expand the program formerly known as the Defense Humint Service to send undercover intelligence operatives to work hand in hand with the CIA.  The CIA, after two wars, has stretchered its resources to the limits and is unable to focus its attention on the issues which most interest the DOD and the Pentagon when it comes to foreign military threats such as Iran and China.  DCS “case officers” will train and deploy alongside their CIA counterparts, working out of US embassies around the world and working under CIA station chiefs.  DIA operatives, because of their military backgrounds, are believed to be better equipped to collect specific information about military technology that the Pentagon requires to thwart any national security threats.  However, there are still some issues looming around about the creation of undercover slots for the newly formed DCS, as all slots in US embassies are taken by the CIA.  Even so, the Pentagon and the CIA both agree that the newly formed military spy agency is necessary and will be very helpful in assisting the CIA mission abroad. 

Although the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Clandestine Service (NCS) is responsible for all foreign intelligence collection, the Defense Intelligence Agency created the newly formed Defense Clandestine Service (DCS).  Under the Department of the Defense’s management, the DCS will join the NCS in solely collecting foreign military and defense intelligence to satisfy the DOD and DIA’s intelligence collection requirements.  This paper will attempt to answer why was this service created if the CIA’s NCS was conducting the same operations?

This research paper will attempt to answer why the Defense Intelligence Agency created the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) similar to that of the Central Intelligence Agency? Was the DIA’s intelligence collection requirements unfulfilled by the CIA’s NCS, or was it nothing more than bureaucracy in order for the DIA to get some recognition and funding? How does the DCS organizational structure differ from the NCS? And what are the DCS’s operational purposes and priorities?

In a scholarly article by Mark Ambinder, the author mentions the goals of the creation of the Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) and broke it down to its basic operational elements. During week one’s assignment, I hypothesized that the reason the DIA created its own spy agency was because it was dissatisfied with the CIA’ National Clandestine Service collection and intelligence.  However, after reading this article, it became apparent that the DIA had a different reason.  The DCS will “conduct human intelligence (HUMINT) operations to answer national-level defense objectives for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and senior policy-makers.” DCS case officers “conduct source operations in every region of the world, alone or in teams. They use their innate intellect, flexibility and creativity — augmented by knowledge of the culture and comprehensive training — to recruit and manage HUMINT sources whose information answers national-level defense objectives.” (Ambinder 2012)  This simply means that the DIA will deploy its spies to support warfighters and collect information pertaining to foreign militaries, defense, and national security, which in turn will allow the CIA to “rebalance its own objectives” (Ambinder 2012) and focus more on narcotics, proliferation, cyber-intelligence, China, and Russia.

This article also brushed upon another reason why the DIA wants its own intelligence service. The reason is that most case officers with the DIA were soldiers “thus subject to different and more stringent rules of conduct, and because the Defense Intelligence Agency hasn’t generally been the place where talented would-be intelligence operatives would base their careers. Many HUMINT officers serve transiently.” (Ambinder 2012)

Similarly, a peer reviewed article by Adam Entous closed the loophole of why this DCS was created.  According to this article the DIA is “restructuring is part of a broader shift in emphasis by the U.S. military after a decade of expensive, troop-intensive land wars” which will solely focus on “collecting tactical and operational intelligence used day to day by troops on the battlefield.” (Entous 2012)  The article discussed how the DOD is increasing its “role in the collection of sensitive intelligence about global threats to the U.S” that “would complement, rather than compete with, the CIA.” (Entous 2012)

Furthermore, a government scholarly publication by Army Sgt. 1st Class Marshall was dedicated to explaining yet another side of coin for the creation of the DCS.  According to Sgt. 1st Class Marshall “the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shared his vision of accelerating change and building capacity within the agency” (Marshall 2012).  This article touched on how the director of the DIA viewed the creation of this defense spy agency and how he believed it was a “major adjustment for national security.” (Marshall 2012) The DIA director continued his analysis by mentioning his intention to capitalize on professional development and leadership within the agency by stating that the “DIA has a “fairly healthy budget,” and he said he has made professional development one of his priorities.” (Marshall 2012)

Another peer reviewed article by Greg Miller explains even further to why the creation of this newly formed spy agency was highly required.  This article discussed the new rule of the defense spy agency how it would not interfere with the CIA’s mission.  On the contrary it emphasized that the newly formed HUMINT intelligence service “does not involve new manpower . . . does not involve new authorities” (Miller 2012) and how the DIA is only “shifting its emphasis as we look to come out of war zones and anticipate the requirements over the next several years.” (Miller 2012)

Likewise, another article by Greg Miller explained in more details the intentions of the DIA to expand its spy networks overseas and turn the agency from a war-fighting support service to a full intelligence collection agency that rivals the CIA in size.  The DCS will be tasked to collect the Pentagon’s top intelligence requirements that are but not limited to “Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China.” (Miller 2012)  This article also brushed up on the anticipated problems the creation of this new spy agency would create however according to the DIA director Lt. Gen Flynn, the DIA’s readjustment won’t obstruct congressional inquiry stating that “We have to keep congressional staffs and members in the loop”, continuing “that he believes the changes will help the United States anticipate threats and avoid being drawn more directly into what he predicted will be an “era of persistent conflict.” (Miller 2012)

Finally, a scholarly article by Joe Wolverton talked about the government expanding its spy network by adding an intelligence service to the DOD.  It stated that the DCS’s mission will be “human intelligence (HUMINT) operations to answer national-level defense objectives for the President, the Secretary of Defense, and senior policymakers.  The civilian and military workforce of the DCS conducts clandestine and overt intelligence operations in concert with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and our Military Services to accomplish their mission in defense of the Nation.” (Wolverton 2013) In addition to that, the article elaborated about the US government intentions of mixing up the defense intelligence by hiring civilians that meet the requirements so that “Soldiers (“warfighters”) and spies working together to “protect our national security” globally” is achieved (Wolverton 2013).

The Defense Intelligence Agency under the orders and management of the Pentagon created a the Defense Clandestine Service to assist the Department of Defense with collecting intelligence pertaining to foreign militaries instead of just focusing on battlefield intelligence.  The Pentagon has decided to renew and expand the formerly known as the Defense Humint Service to send undercover intelligence operatives to work hand in hand with the CIA.  The CIA, after two wars, has stretchered its resources to the limits and is unable to focus its attention on the issues the DOD and the Pentagon are most interested in when it comes to foreign military threats such as Iran and China.  DCS “case officers” will train and deploy alongside their CIA counterparts, working out of US embassies around the world and working under CIA station chiefs.  DIA operatives, and because of their military backgrounds, are believed to be better equipped to collect specific information about military technology that the Pentagon requires to thwart any national security threats.  However, there are still some issues looming around about the creating of undercover slots for the newly formed DCS, as all slots in US embassies are taken by the CIA.  Even so, the Pentagon and the CIA both agree that the newly formed military spy agency is necessary and will be very helpful in assisting the CIA mission abroad. 

The hypothesis of this research question was that the DIA was dissatisfied with the intelligence collected by its counterpart, CIA.   This was proposed based on the evidence gathered form the studied reports and journals.  This studied materials at first glance hinted to the dissatisfaction of the DIA with the information it was receiving from the CIA.  However, after further review and analysis, it became clear that this was not the issue.  The CIA was doing everything in its power to provide the DIA with intelligence related to its core mission, battlefield and military intelligence.  The CIA was stretched to its limits given it was fighting many wars at many ends and had exhausted its manpower. 

The real issue here was that the Pentagon and the DOD had finally decided that an intelligence agency should have its own spy program.  The DIA’s DCS was created to tackle the issues that the CIA simply did not want or could tackle. These issues were foreign military capability and intentions and battlefield tactical intelligence.  The DIA, as a result, was forced to initiate or expand upon its own collection apparatus.  The DCS was tasked with the collection of foreign military intelligence, capabilities, technologies, and intentions.  The DIA is believed to be better prepared to tackle such a task.  Due to its military nature, the DIA’s spy program consists of military human collector as well as newly recruited civilian case officers.  These case officers’ core mission is to collect the DIA’s priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) as well as to develop and recruit foreign agents and establish their collection networks.  Further,  DIA’s spy core is believed to be more suitable and fit for these types of intelligence operations because of the majority of their case officers have some sort of military background, which uniquely qualifies them to conduct such operations.

Although this project is still in its infancy phase and will continue to grow and recruit until 2018 (Wolverton 2013), the DIA is already facing significant challenges to establish this program.  Based on the analysis of the subject, one of the issues facing this program is professional development and training new case officers.  The Pentagon, DODO, and CIA agreed that the development of new case officers will be conducted alongside the CIA (Miller 2012) to avoid unnecessary spending and help build the comradery between the two intelligence services.  The second and most focused on issue was the stationing of these DIA new case officers.  Due to the limited number of slots for intelligence officers within the State Department, placing DIA case officers was presumed to be a considerable challenge.  After reviewing and studying the material gathered for this research, only a partial answer was provided for this challenging problem.  Both the CIA and State Department mentioned that if necessary, they will make up more covert slots for DIA case officers.  These slots would be in the shape of military liaisons, advisors and attachés. (Entous 2012)

This program seems to be highly needed within the US intelligence community.  It could have substantial significant on the intelligence collected by the US intelligence services.  This significance could come in the shape of operational success and the collection of actionable and valuable information needed by US policy makers and military commanders to correctly steer the US in the right way, exercise sound foreign policy, and defend the US national security.  

All in all, the Department of Defense and the Pentagon have decided to create a spy agency under the Defense Intelligence Agency to primarily collect intelligence related to foreign militaries and defense in order to fulfill the Pentagon’s top intelligence requirements on other regions besides Iraq and Afghanistan.  The other evident reason that led to the creation of this agency is desire of the US intelligence community and Pentagon to rebalance the CIA’s work load and allow it to focus on the areas which the National Clandestine Service specializes in.  The Pentagon has decided to renew and expand the program formerly known as the Defense Humint Service to send undercover intelligence operatives to work hand in hand with the CIA.  The CIA, after two wars, has stretchered its resources to the limits and is unable to focus its attention on the issues which most interest the DOD and the Pentagon when it comes to foreign military threats such as Iran and China.  DCS “case officers” will train and deploy alongside their CIA counterparts, working out of US embassies around the world and working under CIA station chiefs.  DIA operatives, because of their military backgrounds, are believed to be better equipped to collect specific information about military technology that the Pentagon requires to thwart any national security threats.  However, there are still some issues looming around about the creation of undercover slots for the newly formed DCS, as all slots in US embassies are taken by the CIA.  Even so, the Pentagon and the CIA both agree that the newly formed military spy agency is necessary and will be very helpful in assisting the CIA mission abroad.  This literature review made it very clear that my hypothesis that the DIA was dissatisfied with the intelligence collected by its counterpart the CIA is not valid and clarified the actual reason behind this new change to the intelligence community.

 

Sources:

AGENCY GROUP, 09. n.d. “NEW DEFENSE SERVICE ENHANCES INTELLIGENCE

 CAPABILITIES.” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence DatabaseRegional Business News,

EBSCOhost.

AGENCY GROUP, 09. “DEFENSE INTEL AGENCY DIRECTOR OUTLINES CHANGES

UNDER WAY.” FDCH Regulatory Intelligence Database (n.d.): Regional Business

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Entous, Adam. “Pentagon to Create New Spy Service.” Wall Street Journal (Online), Apr 23,

            2012. n/a, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1008905652?accountid=8289.

Evans, Mike. “Pentagon creates a new intelligence agency.” thetimes.co.uk (2012),

http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?

Marshall, Tyrone C. Defense Intel Agency Director Outlines Changes Under Way. Lanham,

 United States, Lanham: Federal Information & News Dispatch, Inc, 2012,

 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1097822976?accountid=8289

Miller, Greg. 0004. “Pentagon revamps its spying program.” The Washington Post, 4. Regional

 Business News, EBSCOhost

Miller, Greg. 0012. “Military to boost its spy corps.” The Washington Post, February. Regional

            Business News, EBSCOhost

“Panetta: Under Burgess, DIA Evolved into Global Agency.” Targeted News Service, Jul 24,

 2012., http://search.proquest.com/docview/1027703847?accountid=8289.

“Pentagon creates new spy service.” The Guardian (London) – Final Edition. April 25, 2012

 Wednesday.  http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

Reilly, Sean. “New DOD Agency to Optimize Human Intelligence Collection Efforts.”

 Federal Times, May 07, 2012. 6,

http://search.proquest.com/docview/1014428328?accountid=8289.

Schmitt, Eric. 2012. “Defense Department Plans New Intelligence Gathering Service.” New York

 Times, April 24. 5. Regional Business News, EBSCOhost

Wolverton, Joe. “New Defense Clandestine Service Blends Civilian and Military Operations.”

US News (2013), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/item/14601-new-defense-

clandestine-service-blends-civilian-and-military-operations

Ana Montes’ Counterintelligence Case

ana top

Abstract:

This paper examines the counterintelligence case of the infamous Cuban spy, Ana Montes.  Ana Montes was able to conduct her espionage activities within the heart of the US intelligence community (IC) despite the IC’s recognition of a Cuban penetration.  Throughout this paper the history and background of this spy will be discussed, detailing Ana Montes’ espionage operations and outlining the damage she posed to the US national security.  An intelligence analysis and assessment have also been conducted, discovering Ana Motes’ betrayals of her country and the joint counterintelligence operation (mole hunt) conducted by the DIA and the FBI.  This paper will also discuss the severity of the damage posed by Ana Montes as an “agent of influence” as she plainly shaped US foreign policy on Cuba, allowing Cuba and Russia the opportunity to reshape their strategic planning and foreign policy parallel to the US.  Lastly, this paper will detail the accounts of the counterintelligence investigation bringing her to justice and putting an end to the era of Cuban intelligence success. 

 

Introduction:

Insider threats, whether moles, double agents, or agents of influence, are one of the constant security risk counterintelligence services strive to detect, deter, and defend against.  Ana Montes proved to be a challenging threat to detect and thwart.  Her perfect persona and exemplary work ethics and record kept her seamlessly undetected for years while she spied for the Cubans, influenced US foreign policy pertaining to Cuban affairs, and was allegedly responsible for the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) in 1996 (Carmichael 2007, 7).  The counterintelligence operation mounted against her also known as (Ana Montes’ counterintelligence case) by DIA counterintelligence officer Scott Carmichael and the FBI to detect the Cuban spy that operated in the heart of the US intelligence community was a pain staking operation (Johnson 2001).  This operation was both a success and a failure to a certain extent, given Ana Montes had already caused grave damage by the time she was detected.

Ana Montes swiftly proved herself and was promptly advanced through the DIA ranks until she became a senior military and political analyst on Cuba in 1992 (Johnson 2001).  It was during this time that Ana gained access to classified information of Cuban interest (Gertz 2007).  Her deviousness and cleverness allowed her pass US classified materials to her Cuban handlers in Washington DC and in Cuba during her several unsuspected trips to Cuba (Gertz, 2007).   Ana Montes was the Cuban mole that operated in the core of the US intelligence community, was able to influence US foreign policy on Cuba, and responsible of the deaths of several BTTRs, all because she sympathized for the Cuban people and deeply disagreed with the US foreign policy on Cuba, thinking that the US was too harsh on them (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  

The US counterintelligence services looked for the suspected Cuban spy everywhere.  No one would have ever suspected her of any wrong doing if it was not for two situational aware DIA employees (Marquis 2001).  Ana Montes was reported to the DIA counterintelligence office on two separate occasions four years apart.  It was because of these reports that DIA counterintelligence officer Carmichael launched the counterintelligence operation to bring the Cuban spy down (Golden 2002).  With the cooperation of the FBI, Carmichael was able to zero in on Ana Montes and blow her cover as the infamous Cuban spy that haunted Washington policy makers and intelligence officials (Golden 2002).  Ana Montes was arrested in September 21, 2001 and was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage for a foreign government.  She pleaded guilty and received a sentence of 25 years in prison, followed by five year probation (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  

Ana Montes at DIA:

Ana Montes was recruited by the Cuban intelligence services while she was finishing her graduate degree in Advanced International Studies.  By the time she obtained employment with the DIA in 1985, Ana Montes was a full-fledged Cuban spy (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).   Ana Montes was an exemplary employee and her performance by her colleagues and supervisors was always rated as outstanding and described her as an “exceedingly rare” employee (Carmichael 2007, 54).  She was the ideal candidate for the job.  Given her Latina ethnicity and educational background, Ana Montes easily secured a position as an analyst on Latin affairs, Cuba specifically.  She was rapidly promoted through the DIA’s ranks to the DIA’s senior intelligence analyst on Cuban politics and military affairs (Golden 2002).  While employed by the DIA, Ana Montes had the perfect opportunity to satisfy her Cuban handlers’ intelligence thirst.

ana 1 Photo 1: Ana Montes’ official day of employment with the DIA in 1985.

Ana Montes used her “pillar employee” status and access to highly classified US documents pertaining to Cuba, even Russia at times, to clandestinely gather intelligence and communicate it to her Cuban handlers in Washington DC (Golden 2002).  Ana Montes was also able to communicate with the Cuban as she was able “to travel to Cuba at least four times while working for the DIA” as she was selected for the DIA’s Exceptional Analyst Program to study the Cuban military in1992 (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).

Mon00 Spy Nat KRTPhoto 2: Ana Montes selected for the DIA’s Exceptional Analyst Program, traveled to Cuba to study the Cuban military in 1992.

.

Ana Montes’ Espionage Methodology:

Ana Montes was extremely brilliant when it came to how she conducted her espionage activities.   She was careful not to leave any trace linking her back to her misconduct.  She did not remove any documents from her place of work, whether electronic or hard copies.  Instead, “she kept the details in her head and went home and typed them up on her laptop. Then, she transferred the information onto encrypted disks.” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,)  This way, she avoided the DIA’s security and counterintelligence branch from tracking her down early in her espionage career. 

In addition, after Ana Montes received her commands from the Cubans through a short-wave radio, she then would meet with her handler and pass on the encrypted disks she made (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  Furthermore, Ana Montes contacted the Cubans over coded messages and received her guidelines through shortwave encoded broadcasts from Cuba (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  Finally, Ana Montes “communicated by coded numeric pager messages with the Cuban Intelligence Service by public telephones located in the District of Columbia and Maryland. The codes included ‘I received message’ or ‘danger’” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).

ana 3Photo 3: coded numeric messages Ana Montes used to communicate with the Cubans.

National Security Damage Caused by Montes:

Ana Montes was considered one of the most damaging spies in US history.  She was labeled as such due to her significant influence on US/ Cuban relations and loss of lives.  Ana Montes’ analyses were guarded as very accurate and extensive by her supervisors as she became the DIA’s senior intelligence analyst on Cuban politics and military affairs (Marquis 2001).  She was recommended to “help draft a 1998 official US Government finding that Cuba no longer presents a military threat to the United States” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  Her involvement in shaping US foreign policy on Cuba caused grave damage to the US national security.  In her trial, Ana Montes indicated that she did what she did solely based on ideology, as she stated “I believe our government’s policy towards Cuba is cruel and unfair, profoundly unneighborly, and I felt morally obligated to help the island defend itself from our efforts to impose our values and our political system on it. We have displayed intolerance and contempt towards Cuba for most of the last four decades. We have never respected Cuba’s right to make its own journey towards its own ideals of equality and justice”, she also added “I do not understand why we must continue to dictate how the Cubans should select their leaders, who their leaders cannot be, and what laws are appropriate in their land. Why can’t we let Cuba pursue its own internal journey, as the United States has been doing for over two centuries?” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,)

During the counterintelligence investigation mounted to thwart the Cuban mole operating within the heart of the intelligence community (IC), the FBI, CIA, and DIA investigators came to realize the damage caused by Ana Montes.  Ana Montes provided the Cubans with a substantial amount of classified information about US foreign policy on Cuba and clandestine intelligence operations ongoing in Cuba to include the identities of four American spies (Gertz 2007). 

Moreover, the counterintelligence officers determined based on the evidence mounting against Montes that she also provided the Cubans with information about a US Army Special Forces covert camp in El Salvador (Gertz 2007).  The compromise of a highly classified US military camp and operation in El Salvador resulted in the death of a Special Forces soldier, Sgt. Gregory A. Fronuis, after the guerrillas of the FMLN attacked the camp on March 31, 1987.  Counterintelligence officers concluded that Ana Montes was responsible for this betrayal after their investigation indicated that Montes was in Cuba only weeks before the camp was ambushed (Gertz 2007). 

ana 4 Photo 4: Sgt. Gregory Fronuis killed by hostile fire in El Salvador march 31, 1987 as a result of Ana Montes’ betrayal

In addition, counterintelligence investigators believed that Ana Montes orchestrated the process “to be selected to represent the DIA for a special Cuba related joint project” to provide the Cubans with information about a “Brothers To The Rescue” mission that resulted in the shoot down of their plane by Cuban fighter jets in 1996 (Carmichael 2007, 9).  She also disclosed CIA’s operations in Cuba to her handler because CIA operations encountered persistent obstacles in handling their Cuban agents after the same event.

The CI Investigation:

            Ana Montes’ counterintelligence investigation was unlike any other of its time.  The primary counterintelligence officer that was tasked to bring Ana Montes down before joining forces with the FBI was Scott Carmichael.  Carmichael’s first technique was to develop “straw men” (Carmichael 2007, 31).  These individuals “serve as a template against which investigators might measure potential suspects to gauge the likelihood that a particular suspect was a Cuban spy” (Carmichael 2007, 31).  This technique failed Carmichael because it functioned on the preconceived bases that all possible spies are men.  This method was based on the historical figures and statistics that indicated that “93 percent of males engage in espionage and only 7 percent were females” (Carmichael 2007, 36).  This apparatus failed because it simply ruled out the probability of a female spy. 

Carmichael than – with a little bit of common sense- zeroed in his attention to individuals that “would be employed as a specialist in Latin American Affairs” (Carmichael 2007, 31).  Although this method was rather a possible big operation with multiple intelligence agencies to look into, it was plausible because it narrowed down the scope to intelligence professionals that specialize in Latin America’s affairs, a convenient position for a spy in need of Cuban information.  Unfortunately, this technique did not yield any promising results either. 

In 1996, Ana Montes’ colleague Reg Brown reported to the counterintelligence officer that “he felt Montes might be under the influence of Cuban intelligence” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).  Counterintelligence officer Carmichael interviewed Ana, but she answered every question confidently.  Her responses checked out to be legitimate and truthful after Carmichael followed up her alibies.  Ana Montes had also just passed a counterintelligence polygraph two years prior to her interview (Johnson 2001).   It was until FBI counterintelligence officials were certain that there is a Cuban mole operating in the heart of the intelligence community, four years later, that counterintelligence investigator Carmichael “contacted the FBI with his suspicions” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,).

During the investigation, the FBI acquired court approval to enter and search Ana Montes’ apartment.  Special agents found “a shortwave radio, an earpiece and a laptop computer.” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,)  The FBI copied Ana Montes computer’s hard drive and repaired what she deleted.  They also conducted a major physical and electronic surveillance operation and monitored her as she contacted her Cuban handlers on pay phone and sent coded messages (O’Grady 2002).

Arrest:

            After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US intelligence community especially the DIA and the FBI did not want to wait any longer from fear that Ana Montes may again pass on intelligence to Cuba, intelligence that could be delivered to terrorists given Cuba’s relations with terrorist organizations.  Ana Montes was aware of US military highly classified information about the impending invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 (O’Grady 2002).   

DIA and FBI did not want to give her the chance to pass that intelligence to the Cubans therefore the possibility of the Cubans passing it on to US adversaries (Gertz 2007).  The FBI expedited Ana Montes’ arrest (Miller et al 2001).  She was arrested on September 20, 2001 at DIA’s headquarters.  Ana Montes was charged with “conspiracy to commit espionage 18 USC § 794 (a) and (c)” (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,) because she used her position as a senior intelligence analyst to unlawfully provide and transmit highly classified US national security information to the Cuban government (Marquis 2001).  Ana Montes received a twenty five year prison sentence and five years’ probation as a result of her deceitful and cowardly deed (Miller et al 2001).  

Conclusion:

Insiders threats are one of the persistent security risk counterintelligence services endeavor to detect, deter, and defend against.  Ana Montes attested to the existence of such threats and the difficulty to detect and thwart them.  Her perfect persona and exemplary work ethics and record kept her seamlessly undetected for years while she spied for the Cubans delivering highly classified information about US operations in El Salvador and Cuba, influenced US foreign policy pertaining to Cuban affairs, and was allegedly responsible for the shoot down of the Brothers to the Rescue (BTTR) in 1996 and the death of Special Forces Sgt. Fronuis (Carmichael 2007, 7).  The counterintelligence operation mounted against her by DIA counterintelligence officer Scott Carmichael and the FBI to detect the Cuban spy that operated in the heart of the US intelligence community was a pain staking operation (Johnson 2001).  This operation was both a success and a failure to a certain extent, given Ana Montes had already caused grave damage to US national security by the time she was detected.  Ana Montes was unlike any other spy.  She betrayed her country based on emotions and ideology.  She believed that the US was unfair to the Cuban government and intolerant to their systems.  Ana Montes was arrested in September 20, 2001 as the FBI expedited her arrest due of fears that she might provide the Cubans with more highly classified US information about the invasion of Afghanistan (O’Grady 2002).  She was convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage for a foreign government.  She pleaded guilty and received a sentence of twenty five years in prison, followed by five year probation (‘The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies”,) for her betrayal to her country and damages done to the US national security and foreign policy. 

 

Sources:

“Ana Montes Statement at Her Sentencing.” The Center for Counterintelligence and Security

 Studies. http://www.cicentre.com/?page=montes_statement&hhSearchTerms=Montes and Statement

“Ana Montes Espionage Case.” The Center for Counterintelligence and Security Studies.

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Carmichael, Scott W. “True Believer: Inside the Investigation and Capture of Ana Montes,

Cuba’s Master Spy” Annapolis MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 2007.

Gertz, Bill. “DIA official warns about Cuban spies.” Washington Times, The (DC), n.d.,

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Golden, Tim. “Pentagon’s Top Cuba Expert Pleads Guilty to Espionage.” New York Times,

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Golden, Tim. “White House Wary of Cuba’s Little Spy Engine That Could.” New York Times,

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(2001), http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/espionage/montes-rising.htm

Johnson, Tim. “She Led Two Lives- Dutiful Analyst, And Spy For Cuba.” The Miami Herald

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Marquis, Christopher. “Labels of Analyst Varied, But ‘Spy’ Came as a Surprise.” New York

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DCI vs. DNI

After the creation of the CIA in 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) held many positions besides directing the CIA. One of the DCI’s extra duties was to coordinate intelligence undertakings amid the entire United States intelligence community (IC).  The DCI was considered the main intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council (NSC) as well.  For as long as the DCI had been in charge of managing the entire U.S. IC, there has been conflict and bureaucratic turf wars amongst the intelligence agencies over this role (Richelson 2012, 468).

However, after the unfortunate terrorist attacks of 9/11, the 9/11 Commission Report suggested the creation of a new position to take over the DCI’s extra responsibilities, a position that supersedes the power of the DCI’s authority and leadership over the IC.  Following the 9/11 Commission Report, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) established the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) position (Rosenbach et al. 2009, 14).  This newly created position assumed complete oversight and leadership over the entire U.S. IC. The DNI duties were to “organize and coordinate the efforts of the agencies and manage the implementation of the National Intelligence Program.” (“Week one: Overview,”)  Besides the DNI’s duties as the head of the intelligence community, DNI serves as the primary intelligence advisor the President, the NSC, and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) on subjects associated with U.S. national security. (“Policy Directive for,”)

One of the aspects of the intelligence community that the DNI enjoys more authority and leadership over than the DCI is tasking and responsibilities. The DNI is responsible for managing national intelligence centers such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Office of National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX), and the National Counter-proliferation Center (NCPC) on specific topics of interest across the U.S. government.  He also manages the NIP and directs the agencies that contribute to it (Richelson 2012, 469).  In addition to that, the IRTPA expanded the DNI’s tasking power “over that possessed by the DCIs stating that the DNI shall establish objectives, priorities, and guidance for the IC”, as well as “manage and direct the tasking of collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence…by approving requirements and resolving conflicts.” (“Policy Directive for,”)  The DCIs did not possess this authority as each intelligence agency collected and analyzed independently in accordance with their ongoing operations and requirements.

Furthermore, the DNI has the overall authority over the intelligence community’s budget and funding, authorities that the DCIs did not have.  When it comes to budget, the DNI provides management for developing the NIP annual budget according to the intelligence agencies proposals and recommendations.  He then “ensures the proper execution of this budget and manages NIP appropriations by directing the allotment or allocation of such appropriations through the heads of the departments” allowing him the chance to regulate spending. (“Policy Directive for,”)  The DNI also contributes in the development of the military intelligence program (MIP) budget.  On the other hand, the DNI has control over the steps of the IC’s spending and is able to deny funds until the intended agencies abide by DNI spending priorities. The IRTPA obligates the DNI to “inform congress if a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a DNI spending directive.” (Richelson 2012, 469)

Another difference between the DNI and the DCI is their relationship with other members of the IC is personnel management. The DNI has the authority to transfer and assign personnel and staff for up to two years from one agency or national intelligence center to another without concurrence of the agency’s director.  DCIs were obligated to acquire concurrence before transferring personnel. This particular relationship between the DNI and other members of the IC, allows the DNI to assign and transfer the needed personnel to staff to a newly created national intelligence center appropriately.  Likewise, the DNI enjoys other relationships with the IC and they are coordination with foreign governments, management of counternarcotic operations, information management, and security and counterintelligence management. The DNI’s relationship with members of the IC authorizes him to ensure complete leadership and supervision of the IC’s activities and operational progress, relationships and roles that the DCIs did not have prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 

Additionally, The DNI has a unique relationship with the administration, unlike the DCIs. The DNI is responsible for recommending candidates to the president for positions of heads of intelligence agencies and national security departments.  The DNI’s approval and concurrence of these candidates prior to their appointments is required. (“Policy Directive for,”) 

Moreover, the DNI is authorized to report all intelligence activities to congress for congressional oversight and evaluation.  The DNI informs congress’ intelligence committees of intelligence operations and covert actions and to keep them informed of the progress made in ongoing operations, anticipated intelligence activities, and any major intelligence failures (“Policy Directive for,”).  He does so in a manner “consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters” (“Policy Directive for,”) to allow congressional select committees on intelligence to carry out their legal tasks. 

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had the authority to manage and lead the entire U.S. intelligence community. The DCI was also the main intelligence advisor to the President and the National Security Council (NSC).  However, after the unfortunate terrorist attacks of 9/11, the 9/11 commission report suggested the creation of a new position to take control over the DCI’s extra responsibilities, a position that supersedes the DCI’s authority and leadership over the IC.  The entire intelligence community went through necessary reforms to adapt and reorganize in order to be able to successfully and effectively tackle the new dangers of transitional terrorism threatening the U.S. national security. This newly created DNI’s authority far exceeded the authority the DCIs used to have. These reforms to the intelligence community and the creation of a new intelligence czar proved to be very suitable to counter the asymmetric threats during the global war on terror, as well as other dangers such as foreign intelligence collection and the war on the drugs.

  

Sources:

“Policy Directive for Intelligence Community Leadership.” Intelligence Community Directive Number 1, 2006.

Richelson, Jeffery T. The US Intelligence Community. Philadelphia: Perseus Books Group, 2012.

Rosenbach, Eric, & Peritz, Aki J. “Organization of the Intelligence Community.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2009

 

The USIC and its FISS Cooperations

Intelligence is a crucial element for the United States to protect its national security, accomplish its foreign policy objectives, and counter asymmetric threats that face it today.  The United States collects its intelligence through a variety of methods and by multiple human and technical means. However, not all intelligence gathered and used by the United States come from its collection apparatuses.  The United States “relies on liaison arrangements and cooperative agreements with foreign intelligence and security services for a significant portion of its intelligence.”[1] This collaboration with traditional allies and non-traditional foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) through liaisons and joint operations, allows the United States to observe, conduct, and control events and operations in foreign countries that are deemed necessary to safeguard its national security. 

The United States has forged strong alliances with several foreign intelligence services, particularly Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Canada’s Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), and New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS). This alliance is known by the “FIVE EYES”[2].  Besides the joint operations and collaboration with these traditional allies, the U.S. also shares intelligence and cooperates, to some degree, with other non-traditional allies such as Sudan, Jordan, Pakistan, Israel, Japan, Peru, Germany, and Mexico. The U.S. depends on these alliances around the world for a substantial amount of its intelligence and operationsto achieve its military, political, and diplomatic objectives to counter the asymmetric threats and transitional terrorism because of the many advantages these ally nations can offer.

Some of the advantages that aid the U.S. against asymmetric threats are the accessibility “to information of areas denied to direct U.S. penetration”, and “the ability to gather and disseminate crucial data, giving the U.S. the ability to respond to time-sensitive threats, greater cultural understanding into a particular issue that the U.S. may otherwise misinterpret.”[3]  This cooperation also provides the U.S. with the ability “to conduct direct military actions to solve a particular problem, usually within the ally’s home country”, as well as the ability “to mask U.S. actions as local ones, obscuring otherwise obvious U.S. behavior in foreign countries.”[4]

The advantages gained by the United States’ relationships with these allies to counter asymmetric threats are tremendously important to the overall U.S. mission success.  One of these U.S. partnerships proved to be invaluable and critical to the intelligence community.  The U.S. liaison with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is perhaps one of the U.S.’s most intricate intelligence alliances. The U.S. and Pakistan conducted joint operations “to fund, train and equip Afghans fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s.”[5]  Currently, the ISI continues to be an instrumental partner for the Intelligence Community “to help locate Islamic militants, Taliban operatives and top members of al-Qaeda.”[6]  Although, it is debatable that the ISI and Pakistan’s military “may be sympathetic to the Taliban”, without the ISI’s intelligence sharing and operational support U.S. operations “to apprehend or eliminate major terrorist threats around the world would suffer significantly.”[7]  Furthermore, The U.S. intelligence community’s reliance on the ISI to counter asymmetric threats was also evident by the amount of intelligence shared with Pakistan and the financial and operational support they receive.  The CIA provided Pakistan with a massive amount of imagery intelligence (IMINT) and communications intercepts as part of their joint operations against asymmetric threats.  Pakistan’s ISI also received “hundreds of millions of dollars paying for as much as a third of the organization’s budget…$10 million for its role in the capture of Abu Zubaydah and $25 million for the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.”[8]

Similarly, the U.S. intelligence community’s dependency on Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) was paramount during the joint operations to hunt for Osama Bin Laden when he lived in Khartoum during the 1990s.  This dependency continues today on the issue of counterterrorism.  Sudan provides the U.S. intelligence community accessibility to intelligence and regions denied to direct U.S. infiltration.  Sudan’s National Intelligence and Security Services offers the U.S. the ability to collect and distribute fundamental information, allowing the U.S. to respond to time-sensitive asymmetric threats, greater cultural understanding, and the ability to analyze and comprehend how terrorist organizations operate in that region. Moreover, U.S. reliance on foreign intelligence services to counter asymmetric threats does not end with Pakistan and Sudan.  The U.S. relies on a number of foreign intelligence services such as Jordan’s and Israel’s to conduct its required counter-terrorism operations worldwide.  Jordan’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has been the U.S. intelligence community’s most effective counter-terrorism agency in the Middle East. The relationship between the U.S. and the GID for intelligence and operational support goes back to the 80s. The CIA and GID “conducted a joint campaign to subvert and cripple the Abu Nidal’s organization – at the time, one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist groups.”[9]  Besides the U.S. intelligence community’s cooperation and information sharing on counter-terrorism issues with the appropriate FISS, the U.S. also relies on cooperation with Mexico for a different asymmetric threat that threatens its national security.  The U.S. relies on Mexico’s Center for Intelligence and National Security (CISEN) for drug related issues.  The U.S. considers Mexico a strategic partner in the War on Drugs.  The two allies share a large amount of technical intelligence especially IMINT and satellite intelligence (SATINT) related to the drug cartels’ operations and production with correlation to the U.S. border security.[10]

In conclusion, intelligence is a crucial element for the United States to protect its national security, accomplish its foreign policy objectives, and counter asymmetric threats that face it today.  U.S. gathers its intelligence by several means.  One way the U.S. obtains access to foreign intelligence, otherwise unobtainable by U.S. apparatuses, is the cooperation and information sharing with foreign governments.  The United States relies on liaisons and partnerships with foreign intelligence and security services for a substantial amount of its intelligence. This collaboration with traditional allies and non-traditional foreign intelligence and security services (FISS) through liaisons and joint operations, allows the United States to observe, conduct, and control events and operations in foreign countries that are deemed necessary to safeguard its national security.  It also provides the U.S. intelligence community with several advantages over the enemy, otherwise inaccessible without foreign cooperation. Over the years, these joint operations and reliance on FISS proved very efficient and workable to thwart the rising asymmetric threats against the U.S. and secure its national security and foreign interests.


[1] Richelson, Jeffery T. The US Intelligence Community. Philadelphia: Perseus Books Group, 2012. p. 347

[2] Ibid, p. 348

[3] Rosenbach, Eric, & Peritz, Aki J. “Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community.” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2009. p. 50

[4] Ibid, p. 50

[5] Ibid, p. 52

[6] Ibid, p. 52

[7] Ibid, p. 52

[8] Richelson, Jeffery T. The US Intelligence Community. Philadelphia: Perseus Books Group, 2012. p, 363.

[9] Ibid, p. 362.

[10] Ibid, p. 362.